Of Cows, Canoes, and Commerce: How the Concept of Navigability Provides an Answer If You Know Which Question to Ask by W.,  J., Looney & Zraick, Steven G.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 25 
Issue 1 The Ben J. Altheimer Symposium: 
Water Rights in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Challenges Move East 
Article 6 
2002 
Of Cows, Canoes, and Commerce: How the Concept of 
Navigability Provides an Answer If You Know Which Question to 
Ask 
J. W. Looney 
Steven G. Zraick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. W. Looney and Steven G. Zraick, Of Cows, Canoes, and Commerce: How the Concept of Navigability 
Provides an Answer If You Know Which Question to Ask, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 175 (2002). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
OF COWS, CANOES, AND COMMERCE: HOW THE CONCEPT OF





Crooked Creek, running for eighty-two miles in Newton, Boone, and
Marion counties in northern Arkansas, and renowned for its smallmouth
bass fishery, was in recent years the center of controversy, which culmi-
nated with litigation initiated by the Arkansas Attorney General. Environ-
mentalists expressed concerns that gravel mining activities on the stream
were detrimental to the fishery and to the stream itself; the state agency with
regulatory authority over water quality (now the Department of Environ-
mental Quality) asserted a right to regulate gravel mining interests; land-
owners along the stream emphasized the importance of the mining activity
to local economies; recreational users, supported by the Arkansas Game and
Fish Commission, wanted to see the stream open for public use; and cattle-
men along the stream saw any restrictions on fencing across the channel as
an infringement of their property rights. All interested parties believed that
the concept of "navigability" was central to the resolution of the contro-
versy.
This clash of interests on Crooked Creek illustrates the extent to which
a seemingly simple concept, navigability, is important in various legal con-
texts: (1) it determines the ownership of the stream bed and, thus, the ripar-
ian owner's rights to make use of the bed and the surface of the stream; (2)
it determines the public's right of access to the stream for recreational uses;
and (3) it is relevant to the implementation of regulatory controls affecting
* This material is based, in part, upon work supported by the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture under Agreement No. 59-8201-9-115 (Jan. 1, 1999). Any opinions or
recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessar-
ily reflect the views of the United States Department of Agriculture or the Arizona Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
t J.W. Looney is a Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus at the University of
Arkansas School of Law in Fayetteville, Arkansas. M.S., University of Missouri-Columbia,
1976; J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City, 1971; M.S., University of Missouri-
Columbia, 1968; B.S.A., University of Arkansas, 1966. He is a member of the Arkansas,
Missouri, and Virginia bars and is Circuit Judge-Elect to the 18th Judicial Circuit-West.
t Steven G. Zraick is Assistant Attorney General, serving as General Counsel at the
Arizona Department of Agriculture in Phoenix, Arizona. LL.M., J.D., University of Arkan-
sas. B.S., Operations Management, University of Arizona.
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either the use of the stream or the stream bed. However, determining how to
define navigability in all of these contexts can be extremely difficult.
This article begins with a review of the general concept of navigability.
Then, it explores how navigability is determined: (1) for questions of title to
the land underlying a body of water; (2) for questions of the public's right to
use water; and (3) for questions of the applicability of federal or state regu-
lations governing a waterbody. In conclusion, this article illustrates, through
the Crooked Creek situation, how the category of rights involved can de-
termine which test to apply to decide whether a stream is navigable and,
thus, who regulates its use.
II. NAVIGABILITY-SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION
The definition of navigability has varied considerably over time and
according to the purpose to which the concept is applied. The determination
of navigability status of a stream for these purposes does not depend upon a
designation by statute or regulation although such designations would be of
value. The Arkansas legislature, particularly in the 1800s, frequently desig-
nated streams or parts thereof as navigable.' Even in the absence of a statute
or regulation, a court may evaluate the actual navigability status of a par-
ticular stream for the purpose of resolving a specific dispute.
Initially, the United States Supreme Court found waters to be naviga-
ble for federal admiralty jurisdictional purposes using a "tidal waters" test.
This common law test developed in England where jurisdiction was limited
to waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. 2 The Court clearly expanded
this test in 1851 when it held that federal jurisdiction extended to all navi-
gable lakes and rivers. 3 In 1870 in The Daniel Ball,4 the Court further ex-
panded the test to find that navigable waters are those that are navigable-in-
fact. Rivers are navigable-in-fact: "when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water."
5
1. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 18, 1881, No. XLVII, 1881 Ark. Acts 93 (declaring Grandee
Lake and Outlet a navigable stream); Act of Feb. 21, 1859, No. 233, 1859 Ark. Acts 300
(declaring Langville River and Bayou Mason navigable streams); Act of Dec. 5, 1846, 1846
Ark. Acts 34 (declaring St. Francis River a navigable stream); Act of Nov. 25, 1846, 1846
Ark. Acts 15 (declaring Antoine River navigable).
2. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 428 (1825), overruled by The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), superceded by statute as
stated in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
3. See Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 443.
4. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
5. Id. at 563.
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In The Montello,6 the Court expanded the basic test it had articulated in
The Daniel Ball by removing the requirement that commerce be conducted
by any particular mode of trade and travel and by placing greater reliance
upon the history of actual navigability rather than upon the fact of present
non-navigability. The Court stated:
[T]he true test of the navigability of a stream does not depend on the
mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the difficulties
attending navigation .... The capability of use by the public for pur-
poses of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the
navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use ....
It is not.., every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe
can be made to float at high water which is navigable, but, in order to
give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and
commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture.
7
This language points toward the relationship between the Commerce
Clause8 and the federal test for navigability-there must exist some kind of
substantial commerce before activity upon waterways is sufficient to make
them navigable-in-fact and in law.
The most sweeping statement of the federal test for navigability is
given in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. :9
The legal concept of navigability embraces both public and private in-
terests. It is not to be determined by a formula which fits every type of
stream under all circumstances and at all times. Our past decisions have
taken due account of the changes and complexities in the circumstances
of a river. We do not purport now to lay down any single definitive
test. 10
Appalachian Electric Power Co. stands for the proposition that if the mak-
ing of reasonable improvements would make a stream navigable for com-
merce, then it may be held to be navigable."1
Over the years, the way courts interpret or apply the federal test for
navigability has evolved. For example, in a 1906 case, Harrison v. Fite,
12
6. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
7. Id. at 441-42.
8. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have power "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States"). The power to regulate commerce was held to
include, by necessity, the power to regulate navigation in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), and Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 632 (1900). See also Texarkana
& Fort Smith Ry. Co. v. Parsons, 74 F. 408,410 (8th Cir. 1896).
9. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
10. Id. at 404.
11. Id. at407.
12. 148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined the
navigability of Big Lake and Little River in northeastern Arkansas.' 3 The
court stated basic propositions that are still relied upon today. 14 However, it
also laid down one rule of law that has been discredited: "It does not follow
that, because a stream or body of water was once navigable, it has since
continued and remains so."15
In 1921 the Supreme Court held that a waterway found to be navigable
remains so, 16 even though necessary improvements are not completed or
even authorized.1 7 The federal district court in In re River Queen18 applied
this variation of the federal test. The court had to determine whether a river,
which had been dammed and thereby had become a part of a federally
owned lake, had ever been used commercially to a sufficient extent to allow
a finding of navigability. The court found the lake, though wholly owned by
the United States through purchase and condemnation proceedings, non-
navigable because "the only possible use of the lake [was] for fishing and
other means of recreation,"'19 and the stream which formed the lake had
"never afforded a channel for useful commerce between states or to and
from foreign countries."
20
Courts in Arkansas, like the federal courts, applied the "commercial use-
fulness test" to determine navigability. In 1882 the Arkansas Supreme Court
adopted criterion that navigability depended on the usefulness of the stream
in its natural state as a public highway capable of carrying off the products
of the fields or forests or bringing to the population articles of commerce. 21
Therefore, the state and federal courts apply the commercial usefulness test
of navigability to all bodies of water, including lakes, streams, and rivers.22
III. NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE
The question of navigability determines the ownership of stream
beds-riparian landowners own the stream beds of non-navigable streams,
13. Id. at 782.
14. See, e.g., George v. Beavark, Inc., 402 F.2d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 1968); In re River
Queen, 275 F. Supp. 403, 407 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Parker v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 813, 262
S.W.2d 891, 893 (1953); Lutesville Sand & Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin, 181 Ark. 574, 580,
26 S.W.2d 892, 894 (1930).
15. Harrison, 148 F. at 784.
16. Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
17. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).
18. 275 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd sub nom. George v. Beavark, Inc., 402
F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1968).
19. Id. at 409.
20. Id. at 410.
21. Little Rock, Miss. River & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 39 Ark. 403 (1882).
22. McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W.2d 661 (1944).
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but the state owns the stream beds of navigable streams. Therefore, deciding
which streams are navigable becomes important in determining stream bed
ownership rights, and several criteria have been developed to aid in making
this determination. On a navigable stream, the riparian owner's rights ex-
tend only to the watermark-a point indicated by vegetation and the nature
of the soil.23 While it is true that riparians may "wharf out" into the naviga-
ble stream by constructing piers and wharfs in order to make use of the sur-
face, the right to do so is not concrete. In fact, the state may restrict this
right because of state ownership of the stream bed, or the federal govern-
ment may prohibit it under the federal power to regulate navigation.
24
The idea of state ownership of the beds of navigable streams or lakes
derives from the common law of England as applied in the early history of
this country. Under the common law, the Crown owned the beds of naviga-
ble water below the high water mark or those affected by the ebb and flow
of the tide.25 The legal underpinnings of the rule were that navigable bodies
of water were important for fishing and "for highways of navigation and
commerce." 26 Thus, the beds of navigable lakes and rivers were held in pub-
lic trust by the King of England, by the people, or later by the states in
America.27 This concept became part of the law of the original colonies and
was later extended to newly admitted states. To put the new states on "equal
footing," the idea developed that if a body of water is navigable, the state
acquired ownership of the bed and banks to the high water mark upon state-
hood. Thus, if a lake or stream was navigable at the time of statehood, the
bed belonged to the state.28
Prior to the 1920s, state courts adhered to the view that to determine
navigability for title, the appropriate test was the state test as announced by
each state supreme court. 29 No United States Supreme Court case had
squarely faced the issue until Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United
23. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890).
24. The Court summarized this concept in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554
(1981), as follows: "After a State enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state law.
The State's power over the beds of navigable waters remains subject to only one limitation:
the paramount power of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate
and foreign commerce."
25. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing
and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 5 (1997); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 39-41.
26. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
27. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
28. See infra notes 34, 36.
29. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890);
Johnson v. Johnson, 95 P. 499 (Idaho 1908), overruled by N. Pac. Ry. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854
(Idaho 1916); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893); Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W.
622 (N.D. 1921): Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437 (Or. 1918); Welder v. State,
196 S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Griffith v. Holman, 63 P. 239 (Wash. 1900).
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States,30 United States v. Holt State Bank,31 and United States v. Utah.32 It
was with these cases that the Court finally decided that the question of navi-
gability for title was to be determined by the federal test as pronounced by
the federal courts. In applying this rule to the thirteen original states, one
must look back to the time the Union was formed to determine navigability
for ownership purposes.33 Subsequently, as new states joined the Union,
navigability for ownership purposes is determined at the time of their ad-
mission to the Union.34 As in other areas of federal law, the commercial
usefulness test of The Daniel Ball35 also applies in the watercourse bed
ownership cases.36 In other words, under federal law, the navigability for
title rule is stated as follows: the states took title to the beds underlying wa-
ters, which at the time of statehood were used, or susceptible of being used,
as highways for commerce conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. However, if the federal government conveyed the beds prior
to statehood to meet some international obligation, to improve commerce
with foreign nations or among states, or to carry out other public purposes,
the title to the beds of navigable lakes and rivers did not pass to the states
upon admission to the Union."
Congress, in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,38 applied the title con-
cept developed by the Court. Under this Act, lands within states covered by
non-tidal waters that were navigable at the time of statehood and tidal lands,
to the three mile limit, are granted to the states. Interestingly, it was not until
1988 that the Supreme Court determined that the states also took ownership
of land beneath non-navigable tidal waters at statehood (the "tidal for title"
test).39
The key to applying the navigability for title rule is to determine what
constitutes a navigable waterbody. A waterbody was and is still considered
30. 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
31. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
32. 283 U.S. 64(1931).
33. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); see also Rasband, supra note 25.
34. See, e.g., Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 212; Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 367; see
also Arizona v. California, 377 U.S. 921 (1964); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855);
Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850).
35. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). For a discussion of The Daniel Ball test, see
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
36. Utah, 283 U.S. at 64; Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 49; Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co.
v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Utah v.
United States, 304 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1962).
37. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 54-55.
38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2000).
39. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988).
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navigable when it is "navigable-in-fact. 40 This was the case in The Daniel
Ball when a waterbody is "used or [is] susceptible of being used, in [its]
ordinary condition, as [a highway] for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water.",41 To elaborate, the test for navigability is generally comprised of
four criteria: (1) the waterbody should be susceptible to navigation, but not
necessarily ever used for navigation; (2) the navigation should be for com-
mercial purposes, not merely navigation for any purpose; (3) the waterbody
should be susceptible to navigation in its ordinary condition; and (4) the
waterbody should be navigable by the customary mode of transportation in
the area.42
In most cases, the states have not conveyed their interest in the beds
and banks of their inland rivers and streams. As insurers of the public trust,
the states have the responsibility of protecting the public's right to use state
bodies of water. The public trust responsibility extends to the soils beneath
navigable waterbodies and to the minerals in these soils. 43 By contrast, the
general rule for non-navigable riparian lands is that the recipient of a federal
patent to such lands takes title to the center of the waterbody.44 This rule
applies equally to non-navigable lakes.45
IV. PUBLIC'S RIGHTS TO SURFACE USE
The right of the public to use the surface of a stream or lake also de-
pends on a navigability test. This test, however, is not necessarily the same
navigability test as that applied to determine the question of stream bed
ownership. Recreational use of water has led to greater recognition of public
rights to use surface waters through a state test of navigability that may ex-
tend the concept beyond the traditional "commercial use" concept. Thus,
under the state test, recreational navigability may encompass more surface
water than the traditional commercial use concept of navigability.
40. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 557.
41. Id. at 563.
42. Id.; see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-12 (1971).
43. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). States may convey beds of
navigable lakes and rivers to private parties under limited circumstances, but must ensure
that the rights of the public to unfettered navigability are preserved. Id. at 453.
44. Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1905); see also Hardin v. Shedd, 190
U.S. 508 (1903).
45. See Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. v. Butler, 159 U.S. 87, 93 (1895). The problem is
how to apportion the bed among littoral owners when the shoreline is irregular. Arkansas
seems to follow the general rule for non-navigable lakes, at least where the boundaries were
meandered by a United States survey. See McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 179
S.W.2d 661 (1944); Glassock v. Nat'l Box Co., 104 Ark. 154, 148 S.W.2d 248 (1912).
2002]
UALR LAW REVIEW
In Arkansas, the judiciary expanded this concept in the 1980 case of
State v. Mcllroy 6 involving the passage of recreational boaters on the Mul-
berry River. The evidence introduced in the case showed that the Mulberry
River had been used by the public for recreational purposes for many years.
This recreation included fishing, swimming, and canoeing. The court dis-
cussed the standard definition of navigability, but adopted what might be
called the "pleasure boat" definition of navigability. For this purpose the
court suggested that it is not necessary that the stream be floatable at all
times, but navigability can be based on the stream's capability during part of
the year to withstand use by flat-bottomed boats for fishing, canoes for
floating, or both. The court acknowledged the traditional definition of navi-
gability as set out in Lutesville Sand & Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin,47 which
generally focused on the usefulness of the stream for transporting articles of
commerce. The court, however, noted hints in past Arkansas case law that
recreational as well as commercial use of a stream may influence the ques-
tion of navigability. As in Lutesville, the court discounted evidence that the
Mulberry was impassable by boat for as much as six months of the year. In
the end, the court joined several other states that had ruled that a stream,
which supported recreational boating on a consistent basis, was navigable.
Thus, the court reversed the decision of the lower court that found the ripar-
ian landowner could prevent the passage of recreational boaters on the Mul-
berry.48
The Mcllroy case included a discussion of a number of social issues
that are still at the heart of the public debate over stream bed control. For
example, the majority's closing words indicated that the court was stirred, to
some extent, by social concerns beyond those traditionally at stake in a legal
dispute: "[T]he state sought a decision that would protect its right to this
stream. With that right, which we now recognize, goes a responsibility to
keep it as God made it. '49
The Mcllroy decision significantly extended the prior concepts govern-
ing water use. The General Assembly reacted almost immediately with the
adoption of Act 830 of 1981.50 The introduction to Act 830 recites that prior
to the decision in Mcllroy, the Mulberry River had previously been consid-
ered "non-navigable," and therefore, it was assumed that the bed of the river
belonged to the riparian owners. Act 830 further states that the Arkansas
Supreme Court decision has "caused considerable confusion regarding pre-
46, 268 Ark. 227, 237, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (1980).
47. 181 Ark. 574, 577, 26 S.W.2d 892, 894 (1930).
48. Mcllroy, 268 Ark. at 230, 595 S.W.2d at 661.
49. Id. at 237, 595 S.W.2d at 665.
50. Act of Mar. 28, 1981, No. 830, 1981 Ark. Acts 1880 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 22-5-406 (Michie Repl. 1996)).
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viously executed oil and gas leases,"'', because if the stream is navigable,
the state owns the bed of the stream. Therefore, Act 830 purported to dis-
claim the state's title and interest in any gas, oil, or other minerals under the
bed of the Mulberry. 52 The Mcliroy decision and the legislative reaction
represent the increased legal and public awareness of the importance of wa-
ter resources. The legislative action accepts the Mcllroy ruling as a proper
statement of the law although it may have been based on understandable
confusion as to the effect of the decision regarding stream bed ownership.
V. NAVIGABILITY AND REGULATORY CONTROLS
The federal government, through the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution, has considerable power related to development activi-
ties within watercourses. These include the planning, construction, and op-
eration of flood control, irrigation, hydroelectric, and water supply projects.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is broad indeed, and easily en-
compasses these development activities even though the regulated waters
are often not navigable in reality.
Traditionally, Congress limited the exercise of its regulatory reach to
activities in navigable waters. However, the courts, in a sense, began to
broaden jurisdiction by expanding the definition of navigability. For exam-
ple, the Court expanded the test of navigability in the 1874 case The Mon-
tello53 to include waters that had the capability of commercial use, not
merely those in actual use.54 The Court again expanded the definition in the
1921 case Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States55 to bring in water-
bodies whose history of commercial use made it navigable despite subse-
quent physical or economic changes preventing present use for commerce.
5 6
In the 1940 case United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,57 the
Court held that a waterway would be deemed navigable-in-fact if by "rea-
51. Id. at 1881.
52. Id. This legislative solution is similar to that of Act 112 of 1965 where the General
Assembly sought to clarify the ownership of lands inundated by artificially created lakes and
channels that were presumptively navigable. Notably, Act 112 also provided that "the exer-
cise of rights of extraction and removal ... [of minerals under inundated lands] shall not be
permitted to interfere with or impair, the rights of public navigation, transportation, fishing,
and recreation in and upon such navigable waters." Act of Feb. 23, 1965, No. 112, 1965
Ark. Acts 310 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 22-5-815 (Michie Repl. 1996)) (emphasis
added).
53. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
54. Id
55. 256 U.S. 113, 113-14 (1921).
56. Id.
57. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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sonable improvements" it could be made navigable.58 Thus, the jurisdic-
tional basis broadened until only the most insignificant body of water could
escape one of the tests of navigability.
In early cases construing federal power, the courts focused on the ques-
tion of whether the particular waterway was navigable as a means of deter-
mining whether the activity could be federally regulated.59 In particular, the
power to control commerce, which is given to Congress, necessarily in-
cluded power over navigation. Thus, any exercise of state authority over
navigable waters is subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the federal
government. However, it is clear that congressional authority over water
does not depend solely on the stream's navigability. The navigation power
certainly gives that authority, but interstate commerce is much broader than
navigation. As a result, more recent interpretations allow the extension of
federal regulatory authority to navigable streams and lakes and their non-
navigable tributaries. Federal reclamation, hydroelectric projects, and fed-
eral water pollution control can be justified on grounds broader than naviga-
tion regulation.
One consequence of a determination of Commerce Clause regulatory
authority relates to the federal government's direct control over navigation
and the so-called "navigation servitude doctrine." Essentially, this concept
means that the federal government has a right to make improvements on
navigable waters for the purpose of enhancing navigation and can do so
without compensation to riparian owners. This is the result of a "lawful ex-
ercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been
subject., 60 This power is not, however, limited to navigable waters, but ap-
plies to riverbed interests whether retained by the state or held by a riparian
owner.6' And, according to some authorities, navigability is actually imma-
terial if Congress exercises power over a non-navigable tributary to protect
the navigable capacity of a navigable stream.62
Congress formally extended its regulatory reach beyond navigation on
October 18, 1972, when it enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA),63 which
establishes regulatory programs to combat pollution of the nation's waters.
58. Id. at 409.
59. E.g., Econ. Light, 256 U.S. at 113; Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900);
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); The Montello, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) at 430; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
60. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) (citing United States v. Chicago,
312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941)); see also Chris A. Shafer, Public Rights in Michigan's
Streams: Toward a Modern Definition of Navigability, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 9 (1999).
61. See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 704 n.3 (1987).
62. See Ralph W. Johnson & Russell A. Austin, Jr., Recreational Rights and Titles to
Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1, 14 n.65 (1967).
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000) (originally titled the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972).
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Congress adopted the CWA to provide the legislative vehicle for regulating
the discharge of pollutants into surface waters by municipal sources, indus-
trial sources, and other specific and non-specific sources. The national goal
is to eliminate the discharge of pollutants.64 Congress made unlawful "the
discharge of any pollutant by any person" except as in compliance with the
CWA.65 It defined "discharge of a pollutant," in part, as "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
66
Due to a statutory definition of navigable waters as "the waters of the
United States," the CWA is potentially expansive in application.67 The term
"waters of the United States" has been judicially interpreted to include al-
most all surface waters, permanent and transient, navigable and non-
navigable. For example, in United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation
Co., the defendant, Ashland Oil, was indicted for failing to immediately
report the discharge of 3200 gallons of oil into a creek. Ashland Oil claimed
that Congress did not have the constitutional power to control pollution on
non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams. The company alleged that
the creek was non-navigable in fact and that the discharge never reached
navigable water. The Court indulged in generous quotations from the statu-
tory language of the CWA to make the following point: "Congress' clear
intention as revealed in the Act itself was to effect marked improvement in
the quality of the total water resources of the United States, regardless of
whether that water was at the point of pollution a part of a navigable
stream., 69 The Court squarely addressed the issue of congressional intent by
stating: "[W]e believe Congress knew exactly what it was doing and that it
intended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [CWA] to apply, as Con-
gressman Dingell put it, 'to all waterbodies, including main streams and
their tributaries. ,
70
The Ashland Oil case gave rise to the following two questions: (1) Did
Congress intend to define away the old navigability restriction and (2) Does
Congress have such power? The court in United States v. Holland,7' citing
Ashland Oil, answered affirmatively to both.72 In Holland, the government
contended that defendants filled the waters of a bayou with sand, dirt,
dredged spoil, and biological materials without the permits required under
the CWA. The courts had not yet been faced with the question of whether
64. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
65. Id. § 1311(a).
66. Id. § 1362(12).
67. Id. § 1362(7).
68. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 1323.
70. Id. at 1325.
71. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
72. Id at 671-73.
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federal jurisdiction over water pollution encompassed wetlands above the
mean high water line.73 In a well-reasoned opinion, the court set out its ra-
tionale for why the waters receiving the impact of the prohibited conduct
were indeed within the jurisdiction of the CWA.7 4 Because the congres-
sional effort was to control the discharge of pollutants at the source, it was
necessary to go "beyond the confines of a high water line" to do so] 5 The
court reasoned that Congress had "wisely" determined that federal authority
to control pollution rests on the Commerce Clause, which gave Congress
"ample authority to reach activities above the mean high water line.",76 This
approach was dramatically illustrated the next year when another federal
district court, in interpreting the term "navigable waters," indicated that
Congress had asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters "to the
maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause" and the term
"navigable waters" as used in the water pollution legislation was "not lim-
ited to the traditional tests of navigability.
77
The Supreme Court in the 1985 "takings" case of United States v. Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, Inc., 8 further demonstrated that regulation under
the CWA was not tied to navigability. The plaintiff challenged the Army
Corps of Engineers' (the "Corps") regulation, which required a permit be-
fore fill material could be placed on the plaintiffs property.79 The Court
held that neither the imposition of the permit requirement itself nor the de-
nial of a permit necessarily constitutes a taking.80 The Court was also per-
suaded that the language, policies, and history of the CWA compelled a
finding that the Corps acted reasonably in interpreting the CWA to require
permits for the discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to the "wa-
ters of the United States. 81
However, in its most recent effort to deal with the question, Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,8 2 the Court gave the CWA provisions a less expansive reading
and refused to extend the authority of the Corps to regulate wetlands not
73. Id. at 670. These wetlands, referred to as "intertidal," were not within the traditional
scope of federal jurisdiction. See id
74. Id.
75. Id. at 675.
76. Id. at 676.
77. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
78. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
79. Id. at 124.
80. Id. at 126.
81. Id. at 131.
82. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). For an insightful analysis of this case, see Margaret A. Johns-
ton, Note, The Supreme Court Scales Back the Army Corps of Engineers' Jurisdiction over
"Navigable Waters" Under the Clean Water Act, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 329
(2002).
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adjacent to open water. In this case, the Corps had asserted jurisdiction over
the site of an abandoned sand and gravel pit mining operation, which had,
since abandonment, evolved into permanent and seasonal ponds used as
habitat by migratory bird species. The Corps recognized that this site was
not one containing wetlands, but asserted that it qualified as "waters of the
United States" and that its jurisdiction could be upheld on intrastate waters
that provide habitat for migratory birds.83
The Court determined that the "Migratory Bird Rule ' 84 was not sup-
ported by the CWA and indicated that Bayview Homes was premised upon a
"significant nexus" between the wetlands and "navigable waters. 8 1 While
Bayview Homes recognized that Congress intended to include in the CWA
some waters that would not meet the traditional test of navigability, the
Court was not willing to agree that the use of the phrase "waters of the
United States" in the CWA could "constitute[] a basis for reading the term
'navigable waters' out of the statute. 86 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, said:
But it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give
it no effect whatever. The term "navigable" has at least the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the
CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navi-
gable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.
87
The Court was also unwilling to find that Congress had acquiesced in previ-
ously promulgated Corps regulations that included the more expansive defi-
nition and assertion of jurisdiction.8
While Solid Waste's more restrictive view of the language used in the
CWA raises questions about congressional intent, it does not alter the
underlying fact that the authority to regulate under the CWA is based on the
broad power of the Commerce Clause, although the majority suggests that
83. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 164.
84. The Corps promulgated the Migratory Bird Rule in 1986. It provides for an exten-
sion of the CWA's jurisdiction to intrastate waters:
(1) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory
Bird Treaties; or
(2) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
(3) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
(4) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217
(Nov. 13, 1986).
85. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167.
86. Id. at 172.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 170.
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when Congress passed the CWA it was exerting nothing more than its
power over navigation. 9 As the dissenting opinion points out, the goals of
the CWA have nothing to do with navigation at all,90 but constitute envi-
ronmental regulation--"an accepted exercise of federal power."
91
Nonetheless, the CWA's power to regulate navigable waters gives it a
broad reach over a variety of state and private activities. For example, the
CWA requires permits from the Corps for dredging and filling operations in
any navigable waters, 92 as well as certification related to water quality stan-
dards by the state or the Environmental Protection Agency.93 In addition,
the CWA provides for the regulation of discharges from individual polluting
activities through the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System.
State law authorizes the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality "to
administer on behalf of the state its own permit program for discharges into
navigable waters within its jurisdiction in lieu of that of the Environmental
Protection Agency."
94
In addition, the CWA requires states to promulgate water quality stan-
dards protecting fishable and swimmable uses in all streams.95 Arkansas law
treats this mandate as an administrative rulemaking function assigned to the
Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission (PC&E).96 In carrying
out the delegated authority, PC&E's Regulation 2, among other things,
designates a use classification for all waterbodies of the state.
98
When the states act pursuant to the CWA, a federal statute enacted by
Congress, they are acting pursuant to specific authority delegated by Con-
gress under its broad Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Actual navigability is
only generally related to a state's congressionally delegated authority to
regulate water quality. Thus, for regulatory purposes, the navigability con-
cept makes an even wider sweep than it does when used to determine title
and recreational rights. Non-navigable water bodies could easily be regu-
lated by the federal government and the state as its proxy under this broad
concept of navigability.
89. Id. at 168 n.3.
90. Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). Under the Supreme Court's reading of the statute, this
includes traditionally navigable waters, their non-navigable tributaries, and adjacent wet-
lands.
93. Id. § 1341 (2000).
94. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-208(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
96. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-202(b)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
97. Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission, Regulation 2 (July 2001),
available at http://www.adeq.state.ar.us/regs/files/reg02 final_010917.pdf.
98. Id. at 3-1 to 3-5.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The litigation involving Crooked Creek set the stage for a definitive
judicial statement on how the navigability concept could be used in resolv-
ing such disputes. All interests asserted that their positions would be upheld
if the court applied the concept. The Attorney General, who filed the initial
lawsuit, asserted that if the stream was navigable-suitable for even recrea-
tional use-the barbed wire fencing obstructing such use would have to be
removed. Environmental groups asserted that this would also mean that the
state owned the stream bed and could stop activities, such as gravel mining,
which are detrimental to fish, wildlife, and water quality. Landowners and
mining interests asserted that if the stream was non-navigable, under tradi-
tional commercial use concepts, the state's ability to regulate, as well as the
public's access, could be limited. On the sidelines, the state agency most
involved in water quality regulation, the Department of Environmental
Quality, quietly asserted that through the CWA and the Commerce Clause,
it had the power to regulate activities affecting water quality regardless of
any finding of actual navigability. Navigability status is relevant to the as-
sertion of each interested group. However, since the test for navigability
differs, depending on the purpose, the answer to the question of what rights
a party has to use a waterbody and the land underlying it depends upon the
question posed.
Judge John Lineberger, who heard the Crooked Creek case in the
Marion County Chancery Court, chose to answer the question posed by the
landowners and mining interests and ignored the other navigability ques-
tions. Lineberger found that the state failed to prove that the stream was
navigable for commercial purposes at statehood, and thus, properly applied
the commercial usefulness test and not the recreational use test urged by the
state. 99 As such, the Crooked Creek case illustrates that determining a
party's rights in a waterbody depends not only on identifying the purpose
for which the rights are being determined, but also on establishing which
test should be applied by the Court.
99. State v. Sharp, No. 97-229-1 (Marion County Ch. Ct. June 8, 1999). Lineberger,
however, did find that the public had acquired a prescriptive easement due to long term use
of the stream. Id.; see also Julie Stewart, Judge: Public Can Use but Doesn't Own Crooked
Creek, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 9, 1999, at Al.
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